Related papers: Some coordination problems are harder than others

This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…

We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…

Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…

When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…

We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

Communities typically capture homophily as people of the same community share many common features. This paper is motivated by the problem of community detection in social networks, as it can help improve our understanding of the network…

When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where…

This paper aims to design a distributed coordination algorithm for solving a multi-agent decision problem with a hierarchical structure. The primary goal is to search the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game such that each player has…

In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…

It is well known that a non-cooperative game may have multiple equilibria. In this paper we consider the efficiency of games, measured by the ratio between the aggregate payoff over all Nash equilibria and that over all admissible controls.…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…

An analysis of several important aspects of competition or conflict in games, social choice and decision theory is presented. Inherent difficulties and complexities in cooperation are highlighted. These have over the years led to a certain…

Efficient allocation and use of limited resources are fundamental to advancing collective welfare and achieving long-term societal sustainability. This challenge involves not only how policymakers distribute scarce resources among…

Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

In this article, we revisit a communication-control co-design problem for a class of two-player stochastic differential games on an infinite horizon. Each 'player' represents two active decision makers, namely a scheduler and a remote…

When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…