Related papers: Enforce and selective operators of combinatorial g…

Let T and C be two Hilbert space operators. We prove that if T is near, in a certain sense, to an operator completely polynomially dominated with a finite bound by C, then T is similar to an operator which is completely polynomially…

In the Avoider-Enforcer convention of positional games, two players, Avoider and Enforcer, take turns selecting vertices from a hypergraph H. Enforcer wins if, by the time all vertices of H have been selected, Avoider has completely filled…

Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…

Often, a given selection game studied in the literature has a known dual game. In dual games, a winning strategy for a player in either game may be used to create a winning strategy for the opponent in the dual. For example, the Rothberger…

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm…

In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…

We introduce a game on graphs. By a theorem of Zermelo, each instance of the game on a finite graph is determined. While the general decision problem on which player has a winning strategy in a given instance of the game is unsolved, we…

The desirable gambles framework provides a rigorous foundation for imprecise probability theory but relies heavily on linear utility via its coherence axioms. In our related work, we introduced function-coherent gambles to accommodate…

This paper presents an approach that brings together game theory with grammatical inference and discrete abstractions in order to synthesize control strategies for hybrid dynamical systems performing tasks in partially unknown but…

Examples of games between two partners with mixed strategies, calculated by the use of the probability amplitude as some vector in Hilbert space are given. The games are macroscopic, no microscopic quantum agent is supposed. The reason for…

We investigate symmetric equilibria of mutual reinforcement learning when both players alternately learn the optimal memory-two strategies against the opponent in the repeated prisoners' dilemma game. We provide a necessary condition for…

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The…

We revisit the role of instrumental value as a driver of adaptive behavior. In active inference, instrumental or extrinsic value is quantified by the information-theoretic surprisal of a set of observations measuring the extent to which…

An expansive, monotone operator is dominating; if it is also idempotent it is a closure operator. Although they have distinct properties, these two kinds of discrete operators are also intertwined. Every closure operator is dominating;…

Subtraction games is a class of combinatorial games. It was solved since the Sprague-Grundy Theory was put forward. This paper described a new algorithm for subtraction games. The new algorithm can find win or lost positions in subtraction…

This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…

Using results from neurobiology on perceptual decision making and value-based decision making, the problem of decision making between lotteries is reformulated in an abstract space where uncertain prospects are mapped to corresponding…

Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…

Aiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-term rationality properties, we derive a second-order inertial system that builds on the widely studied "heavy ball with friction" optimization method. By exploiting a well-known…

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…