Related papers: Multilateral matching with scale economies
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
Some of the most relevant future applications of multi-agent systems like autonomous driving or factories as a service display mixed-motive scenarios, where agents might have conflicting goals. In these settings agents are likely to learn…
We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
Coalitional control is concerned with the management of multi-agent systems where cooperation cannot be taken for granted (due to, e.g., market competition, logistics). This paper proposes a model predictive control (MPC) framework aimed at…
Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper we study natural combinatorial contract settings involving…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
Trades based on bilateral (indivisible) contracts can be represented by a network. Vertices correspond to agents while arcs represent the non-price elements of a bilateral contract. Given prices for each arc, agents choose the incident arcs…
Contract theory studies how a principal can incentivize agents to exert costly, unobservable effort through performance-based payments. While classical economic models provide elegant characterizations of optimal solutions, modern…
Many centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets that enjoy strong theoretical properties assume that the planner solicits full information on the preferences of each participating agent. In particular, they expect that…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
This paper proposes matrix-scaled consensus algorithm, which generalizes the scaled consensus algorithm in \cite{Roy2015scaled}. In (scalar) scaled consensus algorithms, the agents' states do not converge to a common value, but to different…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
As foundation models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents in multi-agent systems, their collective behavior raises new challenges for trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability. Traditional coordination mechanisms, such as…
Are large scale research programs that include many projects more productive than smaller ones with fewer projects? This problem of economy of scale is particularly relevant for understanding recent mergers in particular in the…