Related papers: Credibility in Credence Goods Markets
The sorting and filtering capabilities offered by modern e-commerce platforms significantly impact customers' purchase decisions, as well as the resulting prices set by competing sellers on these platforms. Motivated by this practical…
A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer in a…
We study a market for private data in which a data analyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information. Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy proportional to the differential privacy…
For product rating environments, similar to that of Amazon Reviews, it has been shown that the truthful elicitation of feedback is possible through mechanisms which pay buyer reports contingent on the reports of other buyers. We study…
An academic scientist's professional success depends on publishing. Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and reporting decisions that elicit positive results and…
Prediction markets are widely treated as forecasting devices that reveal collective expectations about uncertain futures. This article argues that under specifiable conditions they also function as coordination mechanisms: public…
Prior research demonstrates that performance of language models on reasoning tasks can be influenced by suggestions, hints and endorsements. However, the influence of endorsement source credibility remains underexplored. We investigate…
We study a financial model with a non-trivial price impact effect. In this model we consider the interaction of a large investor trading in an illiquid security, and a market maker who is quoting prices for this security. We assume that the…
Proponents of blockchains believe that this technology will revolutionize e-commerce. To evaluate this belief, we invite several groups of students to transact on a decentralized peer-to-peer marketplace built on the platform provided by…
Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…
Correlated equilibria enable a coordinator to influence the self-interested agents by recommending actions that no player has an incentive to deviate from. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism relies on accurate knowledge of the…
In markets where algorithmic data processing is increasingly prevalent, recommendation algorithms can substantially affect trade and welfare. We consider a setting in which an algorithm recommends a product based on its value to the buyer…
Reasoning with LLMs increasingly unfolds inside a broader verification loop. Internally, systems use cheap checks, such as self-consistency or proxy rewards, which we call weak verification. Externally, users inspect outputs and steer the…
An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…
When a company undergoes a merger or transfers its ownership, the existing governing body has an opinion on which buyer should take over as the new owner. Similar situations occur while assigning the host of big sports tournaments, like the…
To demarcate the limits of experimental knowledge we probe the limits of what might be called an experiment. By appeal to examples of scientific practice from astrophysics and analogue gravity, we demonstrate that the reliability of…
Most scientific disciplines use significance testing to draw conclusions about experimental or observational data. This classical approach provides a theoretical guarantee for controlling the number of false positives across a set of…
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even…
Extensive research shows that consumers are generally averse to price discrimination. However, instruments of differential pricing can benefit consumer surplus and alleviate inequity through targeted price discounts. This paper examines how…
Interference between treated and untreated units is a source of bias in marketplace experiments. In this paper, we specifically consider pricing interventions, in which a platform seeks to adjust base pricing levels at the marketplace level…