Related papers: Intersection Games and Bernstein Sets
The convex grabbing game is a game where two players, Alice and Bob, alternate taking extremal points from the convex hull of a point set on the plane. Rational weights are given to the points. The goal of each player is to maximize the…
We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…
Consider the following probabilistic one-player game: The board is a graph with $n$ vertices, which initially contains no edges. In each step, a new edge is drawn uniformly at random from all non-edges and is presented to the player,…
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…
We study the computational complexity of the popular board game backgammon. We show that deciding whether a player can win from a given board configuration is NP-Hard, PSPACE-Hard, and EXPTIME-Hard under different settings of known and…
The $k$-majority game is played with $n$ numbered balls, each coloured with one of two colours. It is given that there are at least $k$ balls of the majority colour, where $k$ is a fixed integer greater than $n/2$. On each turn the player…
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show…
A matrix-based framework for Bayesian games is presented, using semi-tensor product of matrices. Static Bayesian games are considered first. Matrix expression of Bayesian games is proposed. Three kinds of conversions, which convert Bayesian…
Bayesian regression games are a special class of two-player general-sum Bayesian games in which the learner is partially informed about the adversary's objective through a Bayesian prior. This formulation captures the uncertainty in regard…
We study two impartial games introduced by Anderson and Harary. Both games are played by two players who alternately select previously-unselected elements of a finite group. The first player who builds a generating set from the…
We present a new variant of the potential game and show that certain compact subsets of $\R^n$, including a large class of self-affine sets, are winning in our game. We prove that sets with sufficiently strong winning conditions are…
We show that the sets of weighted badly approximable vectors in $\Bbb R^n$ are winning sets of certain games, which are modifications of $(\alpha,\beta)$-games introduced by W. Schmidt in 1966. The latter winning property is stable with…
In classical Maker-Breaker games on graphs, Maker and Breaker take turns claiming edges; Maker's goal is to claim all of some structure (e.g., a spanning tree, Hamilton cycle, etc.), while Breaker aims to stop her. The standard question…
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…
We study two impartial games introduced by Anderson and Harary and further developed by Barnes. Both games are played by two players who alternately select previously unselected elements of a finite group. The first player who builds a…
This study provides a model of cyber deception with asymmetric recognition represented by private beliefs. Signaling games, which are often used in existing works, are built on the implicit premise that the receiver's belief is public…
We study the unbiased WalkerMaker-WalkerBreaker games on the edge set of the complete graph on $n$ vertices, $K_n$, a variant of well-known Maker-Breaker positional games, where both players have the restriction on the way of playing.…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
This paper studies sequential quantum games under the assumption that the moves of the players are drawn from groups and not just plain sets. The extra group structure makes possible to easily derive some very general results characterizing…
Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous…