Related papers: A Nash Equilibrium Solution for Periodic Double Au…
We present an extensive analysis of the key problem of learning optimal reserve prices for generalized second price auctions. We describe two algorithms for this task: one based on density estimation, and a novel algorithm benefiting from…
This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
The problem of robust dynamic pricing of an abstract commodity, whose inventory is specified at an initial time but never subsequently replenished, originally studied by Perakis and Sood (2006) in discrete time, is considered from the…
In this paper, we investigate the computation of second-price pacing equilibria (SPPEs), a foundational model in online advertising auctions. We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing exact SPPEs in instances with a constant…
We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in…
In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…
We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…
Demand response has been a promising solution for accommodating renewable energy in power systems. In this study, we consider a demand response scheme within a distribution network facing an energy supply deficit. The utility company…
We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is…
Allocating scarce resources among agents to maximize global utility is, in general, computationally challenging. We focus on problems where resources enable agents to execute actions in stochastic environments, modeled as Markov decision…
We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller $i$ to effectively ``freeze'' their price while remaining active in the auction, and…
We consider a stochastic game with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information, where the agents are trying to acquire as many available opportunities/locks as possible. Agents have access only to local information, the information…
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an…
We study the complexity of finding an approximate (pure) Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a first-price auction with common priors when the tie-breaking rule is part of the input. We show that the problem is PPAD-complete even when the…
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles…
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an…
We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…
We propose fully-distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, (i) the projected…
A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies. A seller(/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the stock…