MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism
Abstract
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1712.06848,
title = {MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism},
author = {Erel Segal-Halevi and Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.06848},
year = {2017}
}
Comments
Accepted to the AAAI2018 conference