Related papers: Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and m…
We consider the problem of rational secret sharing introduced by Halpern and Teague [1], where the players involved in secret sharing play only if it is to their advantage. This can be characterized in the form of preferences. Players would…
Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as a reliable predictor of outcomes, with two of the most…
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions…
Many algorithms have been proposed in prior literature to guarantee resilient multi-agent consensus in the presence of adversarial attacks or faults. The majority of prior work present excellent results that focus on discrete-time or…
Recent advances at the intersection of dense large graph limits and mean field games have begun to enable the scalable analysis of a broad class of dynamical sequential games with large numbers of agents. So far, results have been largely…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (epsilon-Nash equilibria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant. We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It…
Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model…
This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to…
We study the issue introduced by Buck-Lee-Platnick-Wheeler-Zumbrun of synchronous vs. asynchronous coalitions in multiplayer games, that is, the difference between coalitions with full and partial communication, with a specific interest in…
Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID--19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a…
We propose and analyze a broad family of games played by resource-constrained players, which are characterized by the following central features: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional action space, subject to a single sum resource…
In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…
Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting/adding a subset of the strategies that…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a population of agents playing aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. We focus on semi-decentralized communication architectures, where there is a central…
We add here another layer to the literature on nonatomic anonymous games started with the 1973 paper by Schmeidler. More specifically, we define a new notion of equilibrium which we call $\varepsilon$-estimated equilibrium and prove its…
In this paper, we consider a novel $M$-ary sequential hypothesis testing problem in which an adversary is present and perturbs the distributions of the samples before the decision maker observes them. This problem is formulated as a…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final score. For two symmetric players this game…
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games, in a setting where players initially know their own payoffs but not the payoffs of the other player. In order for a solution of reasonable quality to be found,…