Related papers: Truthful Interval Covering
Interval calculus is a relatively new branch of mathematics. Initially understood as a set of tools to assess the quality of numerical calculations (rigorous control of rounding errors), it became a discipline in its own rights today.…
We introduce the study of designing allocation mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods in settings with interdependent valuation functions. In our setting, there is a set of goods that needs to be allocated to a set of agents…
This paper addresses the tradeoffs which need to be considered in reasoning using probabilistic network representations, such as Influence Diagrams (IDs). In particular, we examine the tradeoffs entailed in using Temporal Influence Diagrams…
One significant challenge in cognitive radio networks is to design a framework in which the selfish secondary users are obliged to interact with each other truthfully. Moreover, due to the vulnerability of these networks against jamming…
The maximal information coefficient (MIC) is a tool for finding the strongest pairwise relationships in a data set with many variables (Reshef et al., 2011). MIC is useful because it gives similar scores to equally noisy relationships of…
We study sequential interval scheduling when task start and end times are random. The set of tasks and their weights are known in advance, while each task's start and end times are drawn from known discrete distributions and revealed only…
Interval linear programming provides a tool for solving real-world optimization problems under interval-valued uncertainty. Instead of approximating or estimating crisp input data, the coefficients of an interval program may perturb…
The emerging public awareness and government regulations of data privacy motivate new paradigms of collecting and analyzing data that are transparent and acceptable to data owners. We present a new concept of privacy and corresponding data…
Since the introduction of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), many logics have been proposed to reason about different strategic capabilities of the agents of a system. In particular, some logics have been designed to reason about the…
We consider a scheduling problem of strategic agents representing jobs of different weights. Each agent has to decide on one of a finite set of identical machines to get their job processed. In contrast to the common and exclusive focus on…
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design \cite{NR99}. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning $m$ tasks to $n$ machines for execution. Machines are…
We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a first order Markov process and is independent of the types of…
Fair resource allocation is a fundamental optimization problem with applications in operations research, networking, and economic and game theory. Research in these areas has led to the general acceptance of a class of $\alpha$-fair utility…
The combined increase of energy demand and environmental pollution at a global scale is entailing a rethinking of the production models in sustainable terms. As a consequence, energy suppliers are starting to adopt strategies that flatten…
We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This…
Given a social network G and a constant k, the influence maximization problem asks for k nodes in G that (directly and indirectly) influence the largest number of nodes under a pre-defined diffusion model. This problem finds important…
In many covering settings, it is natural to consider the presence both of elements that we seek to include and of elements that we seek to avoid. This paper introduces a novel combinatorial problem formalizing this tradeoff: from a…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial $n$ approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than $n$ approximate, where $n$ is the number of…
The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in…