Related papers: A Topological Proof of The Gibbard-Satterthwaite T…
By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of…
We say a model is continuous in utilities (resp., preferences) if small perturbations of utility functions (resp., preferences) generate small changes in the model's outputs. While similar, these two questions are different. They are only…
The celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that any surjective social choice function which is defined over the universal domain of preferences and is strategy-proof must be dictatorial. Aswal, Chatterji and Sen generalize the…
Recently, quantitative versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem were proven for $k=3$ alternatives by Friedgut, Kalai, Keller and Nisan and for neutral functions on $k \geq 4$ alternatives by Isaksson, Kindler and Mossel. We prove a…
We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function f of $q \ge 4$ alternatives and n voters will be manipulable with probability at least…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much of the work in mechanism design aims at getting around this…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the existence of voters, called manipulators, who can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically. When a given preference profile admits several such manipulators, voting…
We discuss topological versions of the closed graph theorem, where continuity is inferred from near continuity in tandem with suitable conditions on source or target spaces. We seek internal characterizations of spaces satisfying a closed…
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by…
The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of a randomized mechanism, a social decision scheme (SDS), with desirable fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness properties unmatched by all known SDSs. In particular, we disprove a…
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…
Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other and let g have range S on NP. We complete the proof of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite result - if S contains more than two elements, then g…
This paper introduces a space of variable lotteries and proves a constructive version of the expected utility theorem. The word ``constructive'' is used here in two senses. First, as in constructive mathematics, the logic underlying proofs…
Topological models of empirical and formal inquiry are increasingly prevalent. They have emerged in such diverse fields as domain theory [1, 16], formal learning theory [18], epistemology and philosophy of science [10, 15, 8, 9, 2],…
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…
Preference cycles are prevalent in problems of decision-making, and are contradictory when preferences are assumed to be transitive. This contradiction underlies Condorcet's Paradox, a pioneering result of Social Choice Theory, wherein…
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to…
The continuity problem, i.e., the question whether effective maps between effectively given topological spaces are effectively continuous, is reconsidered. In earlier work it was shown that this is always the case, if the effective map also…
A test space is the set of outcome-sets associated with a collection of experiments. This notion provides a simple mathematical framework for the study of probabilistic theories -- notably, quantum mechanics -- in which one is faced with…