Related papers: Project-Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Budget Ag…
We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works,…
Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the field is that under which valuation domains there exist budget…
We introduce a family of normative principles to assess fairness in the context of participatory budgeting. These principles are based on the fundamental idea that budget allocations should be fair in terms of the resources invested into…
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a…
One of the main challenges in mechanism design is to carefully engineer incentives ensuring truthfulness while maintaining strong social welfare approximation guarantees. But these objectives are often in conflict, making it impossible to…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the…
Behavioural economists have shown that people are often averse to inequality and will make choices to avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we consider how to allocate indivisible goods fairly so as to minimize inequality. We consider how…
We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents. In this problem, each job $j$ has a length $l_{j}$ and each machine $i$ has a private speed $t_{i}$.…
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…
Motivated by fairness concerns, we study the `portfolio problem': given an optimization problem with set $D$ of feasible solutions, a class $\mathbf{C}$ of fairness objective functions on $D$, and an approximation factor $\alpha \ge 1$, a…
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of…
Ensuring fairness in matching algorithms is a key challenge in allocating scarce resources and positions. Focusing on Optimal Transport (OT), we introduce a novel notion of group fairness requiring that the probability of matching two…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
We study the classical rent division problem, where $n$ agents must allocate $n$ indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent $R$. The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) allocation, where no agent prefers another agent's room and rent…
Task allocation is a crucial process in modern systems, but it is often challenged by incomplete information about the utilities of participating agents. In this paper, we propose a new profit maximization mechanism for the task allocation…
Optimal transport is a framework that facilitates the most efficient allocation of a limited amount of resources. However, the most efficient allocation scheme does not necessarily preserve the most fairness. In this paper, we establish a…
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…
We consider budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with additive valuation functions. For the divisible case, where agents can be allocated fractionally, there exists an optimal mechanism with approximation guarantee $e/(e-1)$…