Related papers: Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets
We consider a housing market model with limited externalities where agents care both about their own consumption via demand preferences and about the agent who receives their endowment via supply preferences (we extend the associated…
This paper studies multi-object reallocation without monetary transfers, where agents initially own multiple indivisible objects and have strict preferences over bundles (e.g., shift exchange among workers at a firm). Focusing on marginal…
This paper studies the housing market problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We probe the Machiavellian frontier of the well-known top trading cycles (TTC) rule by weakening strategy-proofness and providing new characterizations…
This paper focuses on the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating resources to agents. We consider a specific setting, usually referred to as a housing market, where each agent must receive exactly one resource (and initially owns…
This paper studies a house allocation problem in a networked housing market, where agents can invite others to join the system in order to enrich their options. Top Trading Cycle is a well-known matching mechanism that achieves a set of…
Top trading cycles with fixed tie-breaking (TTC) has been suggested to deal with indifferences in object allocation problems. Unfortunately, under general indifferences, TTC is neither Pareto efficient nor group strategy-proof. Furthermore,…
We introduce a mathematical theory called market connectivity that gives concrete ways to both measure the efficiency of markets and find inefficiencies in large markets. The theory leads to new methods for testing the famous efficient…
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for trading networks that satisfy four desired properties: dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, efficiency, weak budget balance (WBB), and individual rationality (IR). Although there exist…
We consider multi-item exchange markets in which agents want to receive one of their target bundles of resources. The model encompasses well-studied markets for kidney exchange, lung exchange, and multi-organ exchange. We identify a general…
We study the classical probabilistic assignment problem, where finitely many indivisible objects are to be probabilistically or proportionally assigned among an equal number of agents. Each agent has an initial deterministic endowment and a…
We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and…
In the housing market model introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974), we propose a new axiom, local unanimity, that extends the unanimity condition widely used in social choice theory. It applies the unanimity condition to any subset of…
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible (IC), weakly budget balanced, and efficient. This has led…
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity,…
We study multi-type housing markets, where there are $p\ge 2$ types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on…
The growth of large-scale AI systems is increasingly constrained by infrastructure limits: power availability, thermal and water constraints, interconnect scaling, memory pressure, data-pipeline throughput, and rapidly escalating lifecycle…
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC). Our metrics are designed to capture the…
We study the object reallocation problem under strict preferences. On the unrestricted domain, Ekici (2024) showed that the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is the unique mechanism that is individually rational, pair efficient, and…
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) increasingly manage shared physical resources in the presence of human decision-making, where system-assigned actions must be executed by users or agents in the physical world. A fundamental challenge in such…
We interpret multi-product supply chains (SCs) as coordinated markets; under this interpretation, a SC optimization problem is a market clearing problem that allocates resources and associated economic values (prices) to different…