Related papers: Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
We examine the dynamics of informational efficiency in a market with asymmetrically informed, boundedly rational traders who adaptively learn optimal strategies using simple multiarmed bandit (MAB) algorithms. The strategies available to…
Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…
In the object reallocation problem, achieving Pareto-efficiency is desirable, but may be too demanding for implementation purposes. In contrast, pair-efficiency, which is the minimal efficiency requirement, is more suitable. Despite being a…
I develop a revealed preference framework to test whether an aggregate allocation of indivisible objects satisfies Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (PI) without observing individual preferences. Exploiting the type-based…
When faced with learning a set of inter-related tasks from a limited amount of usable data, learning each task independently may lead to poor generalization performance. Multi-Task Learning (MTL) exploits the latent relations between tasks…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…
This paper proposes a fast Markov Matrix-based methodology for computing Top Trading Cycles (TTC) that delivers O(1) computational speed, that is speed independent of the number of agents and objects in the system. The proposed methodology…
Economic complexity - a group of dimensionality-reduction methods that apply network science to trade data - represented a paradigm shift in development economics towards materializing the once-intangible concept of capabilities as…
We consider an economic environment with one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ refers to the winning probability of an object, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We consider…
We present an extension of Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) that strongly increases its efficiency for trees with asymmetry and/or loops. Asymmetric termination of search trees introduces a type of uncertainty for which the standard upper…
Latent Chain-of-Thought (Latent CoT) models promise efficient reasoning via continuous representations, yet exhibit puzzling performance inconsistencies: excelling at exploration (ProsQA: 97.0%) but failing at computation (GSM8K: 34.1%). We…
Designing effective incentive mechanisms in mobile crowdsensing (MCS) networks is crucial for engaging distributed mobile users (workers) to contribute heterogeneous data for various applications (tasks). In this paper, we propose a novel…
In this paper, we examine in an abstract framework, how a tradeoff between efficiency and robustness arises in different dynamic oligopolistic market architectures. We consider a market in which there is a monopolistic resource provider and…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
In Multi-Task Learning (MTL), tasks may compete and limit the performance achieved on each other, rather than guiding the optimization to a solution, superior to all its single-task trained counterparts. Since there is often not a unique…
Behavior Trees (BTs) are becoming a popular tool to model the behaviors of autonomous agents in the computer game and the robotics industry. One of the key advantages of BTs lies in their composability, where complex behaviors can be built…
We consider one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ either refers to the wining probability of an object or a share of a good, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We define…
In practice, most mechanisms for selling, buying, matching, voting, and so on are not incentive compatible. We present techniques for estimating how far a mechanism is from incentive compatible. Given samples from the agents' type…