Related papers: Solving the insecurity problem for assertions
In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003) show that, when…
There is a large amount of work dedicated to the formal verification of security protocols. In this paper, we revisit and extend the NP-complete decision procedure for a bounded number of sessions. We use a, now standard, deducibility…
Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…
Most of the security services in the connected world of cyber-physical systems necessitate authenticating a large number of nodes privately. In this paper, the private authentication problem is considered which consists of a certificate…
We study the implementability problem for an expressive class of symbolic communication protocols involving multiple participants. Our symbolic protocols describe infinite states and data values using dependent refinement predicates.…
We present a different proof of the insecurity problem for XOR, solved in by Chevalier, Kuesters, Rusinowitch and Turuani (2005). Our proof uses the notion of typed terms and well-typed proofs, and removes a restriction on the class of…
The verification of security protocols is essential, in order to ensure the absence of potential attacks. However, verification results are only valid with respect to the assumptions under which the verification was performed. These…
In this paper, we use the witness-functions to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy under nonempty equational theories. The witness-functions are safe metrics used to compute security. An analysis with a witness-function consists in…
There are often situations where two remote users each have data, and wish to (i) verify the equality of their data, and (ii) whenever a discrepancy is found afterwards, determine which of the two modified his data. The most common example…
In this paper we investigate formal verification problems for Neural Network computations. Various reachability problems will be in the focus, such as: Given symbolic specifications of allowed inputs and outputs in form of Linear…
Quantum protocols such as the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol exchange qubits to achieve information-theoretic security guarantees. Many variants thereof were proposed, some of them being already deployed. Existing security proofs in…
In this paper, we present a new semi-decidable procedure to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy based on a new class of functions that we call: the Witness-Functions. A Witness-Function is a reliable function that guarantees the…
Security protocols often use randomization to achieve probabilistic non-determinism. This non-determinism, in turn, is used in obfuscating the dependence of observable values on secret data. Since the correctness of security protocols is…
Large Language Models (LLMs) as stochastic systems may generate numbers that deviate from available data, a failure known as \emph{numeric hallucination}. Existing safeguards -- retrieval-augmented generation, citations, and uncertainty…
P vs NP problem is the most important unresolved problem in the field of computational complexity. Its impact has penetrated into all aspects of algorithm design, especially in the field of cryptography. The security of cryptographic…
Little can be achieved in the design of security protocols without trusting at least some participants. This trust should be justified or, at the very least, subject to examination. One way to strengthen trustworthiness is to hold parties…
Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure,…
In this paper we investigate formal verification problems for Neural Network computations. Of central importance will be various robustness and minimization problems such as: Given symbolic specifications of allowed inputs and outputs in…
In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…
In this paper, we show how practical the little theorem of witness functions is in detecting security flaws in some category of cryptographic protocols. We convey a formal analysis of the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol in the…