Related papers: Solving the insecurity problem for assertions
This paper revisits formalizations of information-theoretic security for symmetric-key encryption and key agreement protocols which are very fundamental primitives in cryptography. In general, we can formalize information-theoretic security…
Cryptographic protocols are often specified by narrations, i.e., finite sequences of message exchanges that show the intended execution of the protocol. Another use of narrations is to describe attacks. We propose in this paper to compile,…
This paper discloses a simple algorithm for encrypting text messages, based on the NP-completeness of the subset sum problem, such that the similarity between encryptions is roughly proportional to the semantic similarity between their…
In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus, notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools…
A paper presented at the ICICS 2019 conference describes what is claimed to be a `provably secure group authentication [protocol] in the asynchronous communication model'. We show here that this is far from being the case, as the protocol…
Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled using trace equivalence properties in suitable process algebras. It has been shown that such properties can be decided for interesting classes of finite processes (i.e.,…
Due to significant improvements in performance in recent years, neural networks are currently used for an ever-increasing number of applications. However, neural networks have the drawback that their decisions are not readily interpretable…
Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence…
A computational secret-sharing scheme is a method that enables a dealer, that has a secret, to distribute this secret among a set of parties such that a "qualified" subset of parties can efficiently reconstruct the secret while any…
The present paper introduces a practical protocol for provably secure, outsourced computation. Our protocol minimizes overhead for verification by requiring solutions to withstand an interactive game between a prover and challenger. For…
A cryptographic protocol (CP) is a distributed algorithm designed to provide a secure communication in an insecure environment. CPs are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, database access systems, etc.…
We propose to analyse quantum protocols by applying formal verification techniques developed in classical computing for the analysis of communicating concurrent systems. One area of successful application of these techniques is that of…
Attacks on classical cryptographic protocols are usually modeled by allowing an adversary to ask queries from an oracle. Security is then defined by requiring that as long as the queries satisfy some constraint, there is some problem the…
Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol description nor manual annotation of source code. First, symbolically…
Ensuring the correctness of distributed system implementations remains a challenging and largely unaddressed problem. In this paper we present a protocol that can be used to certify the safety of consensus implementations. Our proposed…
We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…
Cybersecurity demands rigorous and scalable techniques to ensure system correctness, robustness, and resilience against evolving threats. Automated reasoning, encompassing formal logic, theorem proving, model checking, and symbolic…
A model-theoretic approach can establish security theorems for cryptographic protocols. Formulas expressing authentication and non-disclosure properties of protocols have a special form. They are quantified implications for all xs . (phi…
Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using…
Security protocols are essential building blocks of modern IT systems. Subtle flaws in their design or implementation may compromise the security of entire systems. It is, thus, important to prove the absence of such flaws through formal…