Related papers: On diversifying stable assignments
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
One of the proposed solutions to the equilibrium selection problem for agents learning in repeated games is obtained via the notion of stochastic stability. Learning algorithms are perturbed so that the Markov chain underlying the learning…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distributional goals-such as multi-dimensional diversity quotas…
Given a connected graph on whose edges we can build roads to connect the nodes, a number of agents hold possibly different perspectives on which edges should be selected by assigning different edge weights. Our task is to build a minimum…
We consider the {\em Capacitated Domination} problem, which models a service-requirement assignment scenario and is also a generalization of the well-known {\em Dominating Set} problem. In this problem, given a graph with three parameters…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
We introduce the notion of a stable instance for a discrete optimization problem, and argue that in many practical situations only sufficiently stable instances are of interest. The question then arises whether stable instances of NP--hard…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
Consider the family of graphs without $ k $ node-disjoint odd cycles, where $ k $ is a constant. Determining the complexity of the stable set problem for such graphs $ G $ is a long-standing problem. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for…
Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where…
This paper introduces the Simultaneous assignment problem. Let us given a graph with a weight and a capacity function on its edges, and a set of its subgraphs along with a degree upper bound function for each of them. We are also given a…
We consider a general stable flow problem in a directed and capacitated network, where each vertex has a strict preference list over the incoming and outgoing edges. A flow is stable if no group of vertices forming a path can mutually…
Constrained submodular set function maximization problems often appear in multi-agent decision-making problems with a discrete feasible set. A prominent example is the problem of multi-agent mobile sensor placement over a discrete domain.…
A longer and more correct title is `a short and direct path to the theory of stable contract systems in a bipartite market'. There is no new meaningful results in the article. It is dedicated to the presentation of a short method for…
We consider the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items among agents having valuations that are represented by a multi-graph -- here, agents appear as vertices and items as edges between them and each vertex…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
We consider distributed iterative algorithms for the averaging problem over time-varying topologies. Our focus is on the convergence time of such algorithms when complete (unquantized) information is available, and on the degradation of…