Related papers: Weighted position value for Network games
The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This…
We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a…
This paper proposes a novel approach to explain the predictions made by data-driven methods. Since such predictions rely heavily on the data used for training, explanations that convey information about how the training data affects the…
In Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced by…
The Shapley value has been recently advocated as a method to choose the seed nodes for the process of information diffusion. Intuitively, since the Shapley value evaluates the average marginal contribution of a player to the coalitional…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money…
Incentives for early arrival (I4EA) was recently proposed for studying online cooperative games. In an online cooperative game, players arrive in an unknown order, and the value increase after each player arrived should be distributed…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
Suppose that $n$ computer devices are to be connected to a network via inhomogeneous Bernoulli trials. The Shapley value of a device quantifies how much the network's value increases due to the participation of that device. Characteristic…
In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…
We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…
The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be "fairly" divided among players. While it has a wide range of real…
The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms. However, in…
The concept of power among players can be expressed as a combination of their utilities. A player who obeys another takes into account the utility of the dominant one. Technically it is a matter of superimposing some weighted sum or product…
We propose the study of computing the Shapley value for a new class of cooperative games that we call budgeted games, and investigate in particular knapsack budgeted games, a version modeled after the classical knapsack problem. In these…
A natural partial ordering exists on the set of all weighted games and, more broadly, on all linear games. We describe several properties of the partially ordered sets formed by these games and utilize this perspective to enumerate proper…
Shapley values are great analytical tools in game theory to measure the importance of a player in a game. Due to their axiomatic and desirable properties such as efficiency, they have become popular for feature importance analysis in data…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…