Related papers: Power relations in Game Theory

Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…

We introduce capital games, which generalize the definition of standard games to incorporate dynamics. In capital games, payoffs are in units of capital which are not assumed to be units of utility. The dynamics allow us to infer player…

Game-theoretic centrality is a flexible and sophisticated approach to identify the most important nodes in a network. It builds upon the methods from cooperative game theory and network theory. The key idea is to treat nodes as players in a…

Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…

We propose a novel network formation game that explains the emergence of various hierarchical structures in groups where self-interested or utility-maximizing individuals decide to establish or severe relationships of authority or…

In applied game theory the motivation of players is a key element. It is encoded in the payoffs of the game form and often based on utility functions. But there are cases were formal descriptions in the form of a utility function do not…

In the real world, agents or entities are in a continuous state of interactions. These inter- actions lead to various types of complexity dynamics. One key difficulty in the study of complex agent interactions is the difficulty of modeling…

In Network games under cooperative framework, the position value is a link based allocation rule. It is obtained from the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game where the links of the network are considered players. The Shapley…

Weighted voting games are frequently used in decision making. Each voter has a weight and a proposal is accepted if the weight sum of the supporting voters exceeds a quota. One line of research is the efficient computation of so-called…

We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…

Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

Inspired by socio-political scenarios, like dictatorships, in which a minority of people exercise control over a majority of weakly interconnected individuals, we propose vulnerability and power measures defined on groups of actors of…

We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…

A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that…

We consider a class of Mean Field Games in which the agents may interact through the statistical distribution of their states and controls. It is supposed that the Hamiltonian behaves like a power of its arguments as they tend to infinity,…

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

In a strategy-proof mechanism, the influence of an agent may be measured as the set of outcomes an agent can bring about by varying her (reported) type. More specifically, we refer to an agent's influence on her own relevant outcomes as her…

The notions of symmetry and anonymity in strategic games have been formalized in different ways in the literature. We propose a combinatorial framework to analyze these notions, using group actions. Then, the same framework is used to…

A game-theoretic approach for studying power control in multiple-access networks with transmission delay constraints is proposed. A non-cooperative power control game is considered in which each user seeks to choose a transmit power that…