Related papers: Complexity of Conformant Election Manipulation
We study a social choice setting of manipulation in elections and extend the usual model in two major ways: first, instead of considering a single manipulating agent, in our setting there are several, possibly competing ones; second,…
Citizen-focused democratic processes where participants deliberate on alternatives and then vote to make the final decision are increasingly popular today. While the computational social choice literature has extensively investigated voting…
When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel compelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system's approval. Models of agent responsiveness, termed "strategic manipulation," analyze the…
While manipulative attacks on elections have been well-studied, only recently has attention turned to attacks that account for geographic information, which are extremely common in the real world. The most well known in the media is…
We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…
We analyse the computational complexity of three problems in judgment aggregation: (1) computing a collective judgment from a profile of individual judgments (the winner determination problem); (2) deciding whether a given agent can…
In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up…
We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping…
Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all votes. However, in many real-world settings votes come in sequentially, and the briber may have a…
Bribery in an election is one of the well-studied control problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we propose and study the safe bribery problem. Here the goal of the briber is to ask the bribed voters to vote in such a way…
Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters…
This work examines the Conditional Approval Framework for elections involving multiple interdependent issues, specifically focusing on the Conditional Minisum Approval Voting Rule. We first conduct a detailed analysis of the computational…
We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters that must be…
We consider the computational complexity of a problem modeling bribery in the context of voting systems. In the scenario of Swap Bribery, each voter assigns a certain price for swapping the positions of two consecutive candidates in his…
In many coalition formation games the utility of the agents depends on a social network. In such scenarios there might be a manipulative agent that would like to manipulate his connections in the social network in order to increase his…
Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to…
The group identification problem asks to identify a socially qualified subgroup among a group of individuals based on their pairwise valuations. There are several different rules that can be used to determine the social qualification…
Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all voters' votes. But neither of those assumptions always holds. In many real-world settings, votes come in…
We study the problem of election control through social influence when the manipulator is allowed to use the locations that she acquired on the network for sending \emph{both} positive and negative messages on \emph{multiple} candidates,…
Knockout tournaments, also known as single-elimination or cup tournaments, are a popular form of sports competitions. In the standard probabilistic setting, for each pairing of players, one of the players wins the game with a certain (a…