Related papers: Game theory analysis when playing the wrong game

In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…

We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…

Many packing, scheduling and covering problems that were previously considered by computer science literature in the context of various transportation and production problems, appear also suitable for describing and modeling various…

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but…

We study in depth the class of games with opacity condition, which are two-player games with imperfect information in which one of the players only has imperfect information, and where the winning condition relies on the information he has…

The notions of symmetry and anonymity in strategic games have been formalized in different ways in the literature. We propose a combinatorial framework to analyze these notions, using group actions. Then, the same framework is used to…

Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one's own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or…

We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed player can try to guess his missing information. Our…

The main challenge of combinatorial game theory is to handle combinatorial chaos, if one player knows the strategy better than his opponent, he is able to determine the exact results of a game. If both players are qualified competitor, the…

Corrigibility of autonomous agents is an under explored part of system design, with previous work focusing on single agent systems. It has been suggested that uncertainty over the human preferences acts to keep the agents corrigible, even…

Artificial intelligence and robotic competitions are accompanied by a class of game paradigms in which each player privately commits a strategy to a game system which simulates the game using the collected joint strategy and then returns…

We consider a scenario in which two reinforcement learning agents repeatedly play a matrix game against each other and update their parameters after each round. The agents' decision-making is transparent to each other, which allows each…

We consider imperfect information stochastic games where we require the players to use pure (i.e. non randomised) strategies. We consider reachability, safety, B\"uchi and co-B\"uchi objectives, and investigate the existence of…

In game theory, players have continuous expected payoff functions and can use fixed point theorems to locate equilibria. This optimization method requires that players adopt a particular type of probability measure space. Here, we introduce…

We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…

The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way…

The rank of a bimatrix game is defined as the rank of the sum of the payoff matrices of the two players. The rank of a game is known to impact both the most suitable computation methods for determining a solution and the expressive power of…

We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…

We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a…