Related papers: Game Dynamics and Equilibrium Computation in the P…
What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents? The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator, are known to…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of "possible profiles" that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile.…
Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from…
We propose a distributed algorithm for multiagent systems that aim to optimize a common objective when agents differ in their estimates of the objective-relevant state of the environment. Each agent keeps an estimate of the environment and…
We study asynchronous dynamics in a network of interacting agents updating their binary states according to a time-varying threshold rule. Specifically, agents revise their state asynchronously by comparing the weighted average of the…
In this paper we consider non-atomic games in populations that are provided with a choice of preventive policies to act against a contagion spreading amongst interacting populations, be it biological organisms or connected computing…
In this work we introduce an approach for modeling and analyzing collective behavior of a group of agents using moments. We represent the group of agents via their distribution and derive a method to estimate the dynamics of the moments. We…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of…
We consider eager-push epidemic dissemination in a complete graph. Time is divided into synchronous stages. In each stage, a source disseminates $\nu$ events. Each event is sent by the source, and forwarded by each node upon its first…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
Evolutionary competition often occurs simultaneously at multiple levels of organization, in which traits or behaviors that are costly for an individual can provide collective benefits to groups to which the individual belongs. Building off…
Achieving convergence of multiple learning agents in general $N$-player games is imperative for the development of safe and reliable machine learning (ML) algorithms and their application to autonomous systems. Yet it is known that, outside…
Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…
We consider a large population of learning agents noncooperatively selecting strategies from a common set, influencing the dynamics of an exogenous system (ES) we seek to stabilize at a desired equilibrium. Our approach is to design a…
This paper attempts to develop a graph-theoretic multi-agent perspective of population games to study the \quotes{truncation} behavior. The proposed method considers fitness of the population as a dynamical system to address the issue of…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…