Related papers: Stackelberg Vertex Cover on a Path
Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new…
In this paper, an incentive proactive cache mechanism in cache-enabled small cell networks (SCNs) is proposed, in order to motivate the content providers (CPs) to participate in the caching procedure. A network composed of a single mobile…
Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to…
Game-theoretic inverse learning is the problem of inferring a player's objectives from their actions. We formulate an inverse learning problem in a Stackelberg game between a leader and a follower, where each player's action is the…
Minimum sum vertex cover of an $n$-vertex graph $G$ is a bijection $\phi : V(G) \to [n]$ that minimizes the cost $\sum_{\{u,v\} \in E(G)} \min \{\phi(u), \phi(v) \}$. Finding a minimum sum vertex cover of a graph (the MSVC problem) is…
The vertex cover number of a graph is the minimum number of vertices that are needed to cover all edges. When those vertices are further required to induce a connected subgraph, the corresponding number is called the connected vertex cover…
This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances.…
In the realm of distributed systems tasked with managing and processing large-scale graph-structured data, optimizing graph partitioning stands as a pivotal challenge. The primary goal is to minimize communication overhead and runtime cost.…
We introduce a new two-player game on graphs, in which players alternate choosing vertices until the set of chosen vertices forms a dominating set. The last player to choose a vertex is the winner. The game fits into the scheme of several…
We study payoff manipulation in repeated multi-objective Stackelberg games, where a leader may strategically influence a follower's deterministic best response, e.g., by offering a share of their own payoff. We assume that the follower's…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy…
This paper investigates a robust incentive Stackelberg stochastic differential game problem for a linear-quadratic mean field system, where the model uncertainty appears in the drift term of the leader's state equation. Moreover, both the…
This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…
This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical Most Vital Links problem, modeled as a one-round adversarial game between an attacker and a defender. The attacker strategically removes up to $k$ edges from a flow network to maximally…
In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for…
We study generalizations of the classical Vertex Cover and Edge Cover problems that incorporate group-wise coverage constraints. Our first focus is the \emph{Weighted Prize-Collecting Partition Vertex Cover} (WP-PVC) problem: given a graph…
In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…
In a large-scale network, we want to choose some influential nodes to make a profit by paying some cost within a limited budget so that we do not have to spend more budget on some nodes adjacent to the chosen nodes; our problem is the…
Inverse game theory is utilized to infer the cost functions of all players based on game outcomes. However, existing inverse game theory methods do not consider the learner as an active participant in the game, which could significantly…