Related papers: Stackelberg Vertex Cover on a Path
We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is…
Covering all edges of a graph by a small number of vertices, this is the NP-complete Vertex Cover problem. It is among the most fundamental graph-algorithmic problems. Following a recent trend in studying temporal graphs (a sequence of…
The eternal vertex cover problem is a variant of the classical vertex cover problem where a set of guards on the vertices have to be dynamically reconfigured from one vertex cover to another in every round of an attacker-defender game. The…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg game of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), where the coefficients of the backward system and the cost functionals are deterministic, and the control domain is convex. Necessary and…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…
We study incentive designs for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games with one leader and a large number of (finite as well as infinite population of) followers. We investigate whether the leader can craft a strategy under a dynamic…
With a sponsored content scheme in a wireless network, a sponsored content service provider can pay to a network operator on behalf of the mobile users/subscribers to lower down the network subscription fees at the reasonable cost in terms…
This paper formulates a Stackelberg game between a coordination agent and participating homes to control the overall load consumption of a residential neighborhood. Each home optimizes a comfort-cost trade off to determine a load schedule…
We study a two-player game played on undirected graphs called {\sc Trail Trap}, which is a variant of a game known as {\sc Partizan Edge Geography}. One player starts by choosing any edge and moving a token from one endpoint to the other;…
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…
Risk measures are commonly used to capture the risk preferences of decision-makers (DMs). The decisions of DMs can be nudged or manipulated when their risk preferences are influenced by factors such as the availability of information about…
Node Kayles is a well-known two-player impartial game on graphs: Given an undirected graph, each player alternately chooses a vertex not adjacent to previously chosen vertices, and a player who cannot choose a new vertex loses the game. The…
In this work, we analyze a sequential game played in a graph called the Multilevel Critical Node problem (MCN). A defender and an attacker are the players of this game. The defender starts by preventively interdicting vertices (vaccination)…
Graph games lie at the algorithmic core of many automated design problems in computer science. These are games usually played between two players on a given graph, where the players keep moving a token along the edges according to…
In the concurrent graph sharing game, two players, called First and Second, share the vertices of a connected graph with positive vertex-weights summing up to $1$ as follows. The game begins with First taking any vertex. In each proceeding…
We discuss an open-loop backward Stackelberg differential game involving single leader and single follower. Unlike most Stackelberg game literature, the state to be controlled is characterized by a backward stochastic differential equation…
Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…
A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
We consider the following two-player game: using observational data, the leader chooses a prediction function for a response variable $Y$ from given covariates. The follower then reacts with an intervention on some covariates in the…