Related papers: Resilient Information Aggregation
Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult for the players to reach an agreement through direct…
An agent makes decisions based on multiple sources of information. In isolation, each source is well understood, but their correlation is unknown. We study the agent's robustly optimal strategies -- those that give the best possible…
We study the bounds of mediated communication in sender-receiver games in which the sender's payoff is state-independent. We show that the feasible distributions over the receiver's beliefs under mediation are those that induce zero…
We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…
The paper considers the problem of multi-agent consensus in the presence of adversarial agents which may try to prevent and introduce undesired influence on the coordination among the regular agents. To our setting, we extend the so-called…
In this paper, we investigate on the modeling of demand response activities between the single aggregator and multiple participating consumers. The model incorporates the bilevel structure that naturally occurs in the information structure…
A two-player game-theoretic problem on resilient graphs in a multiagent consensus setting is formulated. An attacker is capable to disable some of the edges of the network with the objective to divide the agents into clusters by emitting…
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
People often interact repeatedly: with relatives, through file sharing, in politics, etc. Many such interactions are reciprocal: reacting to the actions of the other. In order to facilitate decisions regarding reciprocal interactions, we…
Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…
We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and…
I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
Can Large Language Models (AI agents) aggregate dispersed private information through trading and reason about the knowledge of others by observing price movements? We conduct a controlled experiment where AI agents trade in a prediction…
This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from having a trusted mediator compared with the standard…
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
The emergent behavior of a distributed system is conditioned by the information available to the local decision-makers. Therefore, one may expect that providing decision-makers with more information will improve system performance; in this…
This paper introduces a bilateral matching mechanism to explain why different populations have different levels of cooperation. The traditional game theory assumes that individuals can acquire their neighbor's information without cost after…