Related papers: On "Indifference" and Backward Induction in Games …

Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…

This essay addresses the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for free will. IIT is a theory of what consciousness is and what it takes to have it. According to IIT, the presence of consciousness is accounted for by a maximum…

Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…

We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous…

Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents…

We relate the strategy sets that a player ends up with after refining his own strategies according to two very different models of rationality: namely, utility maximization and regret minimization.

We propose indifference pricing to estimate the value of the weak information. Our framework allows for tractability, quantifying the amount of additional information, and permits the description of the smallness and the stability with…

Truth, consistency and elementary equivalence can all be characterised in terms of games, namely the so-called evaluation game, the model-existence game, and the Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game. We point out the great affinity of these games to…

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…

Corrigibility of autonomous agents is an under explored part of system design, with previous work focusing on single agent systems. It has been suggested that uncertainty over the human preferences acts to keep the agents corrigible, even…

A distortion function, which captures the payoff gap between a player's actual payoff and her true payoff, is introduced and used to analyze games. In our proposed framework, we argue that players' actual payoff functions should be used to…

Integrated information theory (IIT) starts from the existence of consciousness and characterizes its essential properties: every experience is intrinsic, specific, unitary, definite, and structured. IIT then formulates existence and its…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

Possibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential inference" and the more productive (but less cautious) "rational closure inference" can be represented. However, there are situations where the second inference does…

We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory: permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexicographic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based on it, we…

Level-k thinking has been widely applied as a solution concept for games in normal form in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider level-k thinking in games in extensive form. Player's may learn about levels of opponents'…

We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider…

Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…

I study how past and future choices are linked in the framework of attention. Attention cannot be observed but past choices are necessarily considered in future decisions. This link connects two types of rationality violations,…