Related papers: On "Indifference" and Backward Induction in Games …

We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…

We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in…

An individual can only experience regret if she learns about an unchosen alternative. In many situations, learning about an unchosen alternative is possible only if someone else chose it. We develop a model where the ex-post information…

There is a common belief that humans and many animals follow transitive inference (choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C). Transitivity seems to be the essence of rational choice. We…

The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…

In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…

The aim of this of this paper is to study infinite games and to prove formally some properties in this framework. As a consequence we show that the behavior (the madness) of people which leads to speculative crashes or escalation can be…

Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…

We derive robust predictions in games involving flexible information acquisition, also known as rational inattention (Sims 2003). These predictions remain accurate regardless of the specific methods players employ to gather information.…

In competitive games, it is common to assign each player a real number rating signifying their skill level. A rating system is a procedure by which player ratings are adjusted upwards each time they win, or downwards each time they lose.…

In an earlier experiment, participants played a perfect information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in each game,…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…

Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…

We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…

Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interactions with others, they try to read others' intentions and make an image of others to choose their actions accordingly. While the way in which…

A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another---if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players' strategies. In many situations this is an…

We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the…

The rational choice theory is based on this idea that people rationally pursue goals for increasing their personal interests. In most conditions, the behavior of an actor is not independent of the person and others' behavior. Here, we…

Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…