Related papers: The generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen
This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…
In this paper, a distributed non-model based seeking algorithm which combines the extremum seeking control (ESC) jointly with learning algorithms is proposed to seek a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) for a class of noncooperative games…
We consider a game in which the action set of each player is uncountable, and show that, from weak assumptions on the common prior, any mixed strategy has an approximately equivalent pure strategy. The assumption of this result can be…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…
We investigate how the framework of mean-field games may be used to investigate strategic interactions in large heterogeneous populations. We consider strategic interactions in a population of players which may be partitioned into…
In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…
We consider payoff-based learning of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in multi-agent systems. Our focus is on games with jointly convex constraints of a linear structure and strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. We present a convergent…
The paper studies the convergence, as $N$ tends to infinity, of a system of $N$ coupled Hamilton-Jacobi equations, the Nash system. This system arises in differential game theory. We describe the limit problem in terms of the so-called…
In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
Continuous games are multiplayer games in which strategy sets are compact and utility functions are continuous. These games typically have a highly complicated structure of Nash equilibria, and numerical methods for the equilibrium…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian…
We prove the existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of general-sum Bayesian games with continuous types and finite actions under the conditions that the utility functions and the prior type distributions are continuous concerning the…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We solve the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) problem in merely monotone games with expected value cost functions. Specifically, we present the first distributed SGNE seeking algorithm for monotone games that requires one…
We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as a reliable predictor of outcomes, with two of the most…