Related papers: Bonabeau model on fully occupied site graphs
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
We have used agent-based modeling as our numerical method to artificially simulate a dynamic real economy where agents are rational maximizers of an objective function of Cobb-Douglas type. The economy is characterised by heterogeneous…
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
We study a simple but compelling model of $n$ interacting agents via time-dependent, unidirectional communication. The model finds wide application in a variety of fields including synchronization, swarming and distributed decision making.…
We present a dynamical model of web site growth in order to explore the effects of competition among web sites and to determine how they affect the nature of markets. We show that under general conditions, as the competition between sites…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
Competition for a limited resource is the hallmark of many complex systems, and often, that resource turns out to be the physical space itself. In this work, we study a novel model designed to elucidate the dynamics and emergence in complex…
A network effect is introduced taking into account competition, cooperation and mixed-type interaction amongst agents along a generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model. It is also argued that the presence of a market capacity enforces an…
The paper presents a result which relates connectedness of the interaction graphs in a multi-agent systems with the capability for global convergence to a common equilibrium of the system. In particular we extend a previously known result…
We address a problem of area protection in graph-based scenarios with multiple mobile agents where connectivity is maintained among agents to ensure they can communicate. The problem consists of two adversarial teams of agents that move in…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…
We consider the following problem - a group of mobile agents perform some task on a terrain modeled as a graph. In a given moment of time an adversary gets an access to the graph and positions of the agents. Shortly before adversary's…
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length $n$, are decided in an adversarial, online…
We investigate a social system of agents faced with a binary choice. We assume there is a correct, or beneficial, outcome of this choice. Furthermore, we assume agents are influenced by others in making their decision, and that the agents…
In this paper, we study the continuous-time consensus problem in the presence of adversaries. The networked multi-agent system is modeled as a switched system, where the normal agents have integrator dynamics and the switching signal…