Related papers: covering simplicial game complex
The known results regarding two-player zero-sum games are naturally generalized in complex space and are presented through a complete compact theory. The payoff function is defined by the real part of the payoff function in the real case,…
The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks.…
In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the…
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based representation of games, in order to propose a compact representation for multi-party games in game theory. Our method is inspired by concepts in process theory and process algebra. In addition, we…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…
We consider the problem of computing stationary points in min-max optimization, with a particular focus on the special case of computing Nash equilibria in (two-)team zero-sum games. We first show that computing $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a circuit. Our…
In this work, we present a novel characterization of approximate Nash equilibria in a class of convex games over the simplex. To achieve this, we regularize the utility functions using the Shannon entropy term, connect the solutions to the…
Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…
Supermodular games find significant applications in a variety of models, especially in operations research and economic applications of noncooperative game theory, and feature pure strategy Nash equilibria characterized as fixed points of…
In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an approximation of Nash equilibria for multi-player non-cooperative games with a special structure. We consider the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads to a system of…
We compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with pre-fixed structure. Using this representation, we show conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which $n$ selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming that players…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…