Related papers: Coalition Formation with Bounded Coalition Size
Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
We study coalition formation problems in the presence of externalities, focusing on settings where agents exhibit myopic expectations, that is, they evaluate potential deviations based solely on the immediate outcome, assuming no further…
Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in reward allocation is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where…
Coalitions naturally exist in many real-world systems involving multiple decision makers such as ridesharing, security, and online ad auctions, but the coalition structure among the agents is often unknown. We propose and study an important…
In Cooperative Games with Externalities when the members of a set S \subset N of agents wish to deviate they need to calculate their worth. This worth depends on what the non-members (outsiders) N \setminus S will do, which in turn depends…
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several…
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems. A downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet,…
This paper is concerned with the problem of controlling a system of constrained dynamic subsystems in a way that balances the performance degradation of decentralized control with the practical cost of centralized control. We propose a…
We study the approximate core for edge cover games, which are cooperative games stemming from edge cover problems. In these games, each player controls a vertex on a network $G = (V, E; w)$, and the cost of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is…
We examine cooperative games where the viability of a coalition is determined by whether or not its members have the ability to communicate amongst themselves independently of non-members. This necessary condition for viability was proposed…
Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents…
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setting where voters either approve or disapprove of each…
We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as…
Coreness represents solution concepts related to core in cooperative games, which captures the stability of players. Motivated by the scale effect in social networks, economics and other scenario, we study the coreness of cooperative game…
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. Our unified approach applies to a newly introduced family of hedonic games, called $\alpha$-hedonic…
We study the classical coalition structure generation (CSG) problem and compare the anytime behavior of three algorithmic paradigms: dynamic programming (DP), MILP branch-and-bound, and sparse relaxations based on greedy or $l_1$-type…