Related papers: Generalized Veto Core and a Practical Voting Rule …
Simplified verifiable re-encryption mix-net (SVRM) is revised and a scheme for e-voting systems is developed based on it. The developed scheme enables e-voting systems to satisfy all essential requirements of elections. Namely, they satisfy…
In a single winner election with several candidates and ranked choice or rating scale ballots, a Condorcet winner is one who wins all their two way races by majority rule or MR. A voting system has Condorcet consistency or CC if it names…
This article extends the analysis of Atkinson, Foley, and Ganz in "Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked-Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?". Their work uses a one-dimensional spatial model based on survey data from…
We consider a two-round election model involving $m$ voters and $n$ candidates. Each voter is endowed with a strict preference list ranking the candidates. In the first round, the candidates are partitioned into two subsets, $A$ and $B$,…
Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference profile. However, this fact requires a number of voters that is almost…
Democracies are built upon secure and reliable voting systems. Electronic voting systems seek to replace ballot papers and boxes with computer hardware and software. Proposed electronic election schemes have been subjected to scrutiny, with…
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a…
The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric…
In real-world elections where voters cast preference ballots, voters often provide only a partial ranking of the candidates. Despite this empirical reality, prior social choice literature frequently analyzes fairness criteria under the…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…
The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…
Determining the complexity of election attack problems is a major research direction in the computational study of voting problems. The paper "Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting…
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…
We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in the Hotelling-Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst voting rules, in which each voter is endowed with both a positive and a negative vote, i.e., each voter can…
In an election in which each voter ranks all of the candidates, we consider the head-to-head results between each pair of candidates and form a labeled directed graph, called the margin graph, which contains the margin of victory of each…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal…
In voting, disputes arise when a voter claims that the voting authority is dishonest and did not correctly process his ballot while the authority claims to have followed the protocol. A dispute can be resolved if any third party can…
We consider voting on multiple independent binary issues. In addition, a weighting vector for each voter defines how important they consider each issue. The most natural way to aggregate the votes into a single unified proposal is…
Let $V$ be a set of $n$ points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, called voters. A point $p\in \mathbb{R}^d$ is a plurality point for $V$ when the following holds: for every $q\in\mathbb{R}^d$ the number of voters closer to $p$ than to $q$ is at least the…