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Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…
Evolutionary $2 \times 2$ games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability…
To investigate the origin of cooperative behaviors, we developed an evolutionary model of sequential strategies and tested our model with computer simulations. The sequential strategies represented by stochastic machines were evaluated…
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies remains a challenging issue across disciplines. It is an important subject also in the evolutionary game theory to research how cooperation arises. The…
Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The Trust Game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential…
We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one…
In this paper, we consider a two-player two-strategy game with random payoffs in a population subdivided into $d$ demes, each containing $N$ individuals at the beginning of any given generation and experiencing local extinction and…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
The trust game, derived from an economics experiment, has recently attracted interest in the field of evolutionary dynamics. In a recent version of the evolutionary trust game, players adopt one of three strategies: investor, trustworthy…
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a…
In this paper, we analyse inspection games with an evolutionary perspective. In our evolutionary inspection game with a large population, each individual is not a rational payoff maximiser, but periodically updates his strategy if he…
Human social life is shaped by repeated interactions, where past experiences guide future behavior. In evolutionary game theory, a key challenge is to identify strategies that harness such memory to succeed in repeated encounters. Decades…
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD)…
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…
Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an agent depends on the actions in the previous round. Such…
This paper investigates discrete-time evolutionary games with a general stochastic imitation rule on the toroidal grid, which is a grid network with periodic boundary conditions. The imitation rule has been considered as a fundamental rule…
We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by…