Related papers: No-Regret Learning in Dynamic Competition with Ref…
This paper examines the long-run behavior of learning with bandit feedback in non-cooperative concave games. The bandit framework accounts for extremely low-information environments where the agents may not even know they are playing a…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with strongly monotone pseudo-gradients and jointly linear coupling constraints. We establish the convergence rate of a payoff-based approach intended to learn a variational…
We introduce LMLRSGA, a limited memory variant of Low Rank Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (LRSGA) for differentiable games. It is an iterative scheme for approximating Nash equilibria with first order like cost while retaining the…
In this paper, we study the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem of non-cooperative games in dynamic environments. Each player in the game aims to minimize its own time-varying cost function subject to a local action…
An open challenge in supervised learning is \emph{conceptual drift}: a data point begins as classified according to one label, but over time the notion of that label changes. Beyond linear autoregressive models, transfer and meta learning…
A recent line of work has established uncoupled learning dynamics such that, when employed by all players in a game, each player's \emph{regret} after $T$ repetitions grows polylogarithmically in $T$, an exponential improvement over the…
We test the performance of deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG), a deep reinforcement learning algorithm, able to handle continuous state and action spaces, to learn Nash equilibria in a setting where firms compete in prices. These…
We consider an online assortment problem with $[n]:=\{1,2,\ldots,n\}$ sellers, each holding exactly one item $i\in[n]$ with initial inventory $c_i\in \mathbb{Z}_+$, and a sequence of homogeneous buyers arriving over a finite time horizon…
The computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on complete information on agents' private attributes, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice.…
We consider a class of smooth $N$-player noncooperative games, where player objectives are expectation-valued and potentially nonconvex. In such a setting, we consider the largely open question of efficiently computing a suitably defined…
Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…
We study the problem of no-regret learning algorithms for general monotone and smooth games and their last-iterate convergence properties. Specifically, we investigate the problem under bandit feedback and strongly uncoupled dynamics, which…
We study an online linear programming (OLP) problem under a random input model in which the columns of the constraint matrix along with the corresponding coefficients in the objective function are generated i.i.d. from an unknown…
The study of learning in games has thus far focused primarily on normal form games. In contrast, our understanding of learning in extensive form games (EFGs) and particularly in EFGs with many agents lags far behind, despite them being…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
We study the question of obtaining last-iterate convergence rates for no-regret learning algorithms in multi-player games. We show that the optimistic gradient (OG) algorithm with a constant step-size, which is no-regret, achieves a…
This work proposes a policy learning algorithm for seeking generalised feedback Nash equilibria (GFNE) in $N_P$-player noncooperative dynamic games. We consider linear-quadratic games with stochastic dynamics and design a best-response…
Learning in games considers how multiple agents maximize their own rewards through repeated games. Memory, an ability that an agent changes his/her action depending on the history of actions in previous games, is often introduced into…
We explore the striking mathematical connections that exist between market scoring rules, cost function based prediction markets, and no-regret learning. We show that any cost function based prediction market can be interpreted as an…
We consider dynamic pricing strategies in a streamed longitudinal data set-up where the objective is to maximize, over time, the cumulative profit across a large number of customer segments. We consider a dynamic model with the consumers'…