Related papers: Using Weighted Matching to Solve 2-Approval/Veto C…
Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The…
In the weighted bipartite matching problem, the goal is to find a maximum-weight matching in a bipartite graph with nonnegative edge weights. We consider its online version where the first vertex set is known beforehand, but vertices of the…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
We consider a 2-vehicle routing problem (2VRP) which can be viewed as a building block for the variety of vehicle routing problems (VRP). As a simplified version of the 2VRP, we consider a 2-period balanced travelling salesman problem…
A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and…
Recent work has addressed the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions so as to maximize revenue, most of which assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction. This does not…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather than the search problem of finding the successful manipulative…
We consider Stackelberg pricing games, which are also known as bilevel pricing problems, or combinatorial price-setting problems. This family of problems consists of games between two players: the leader and the follower. There is a market…
We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…
We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that,…
An election audit is risk-limiting if the audit limits (to a pre-specified threshold) the chance that an erroneous electoral outcome will be certified. Extant methods for auditing instant-runoff voting (IRV) elections are either not…
Decision-making methods very often use the technique of comparing alternatives in pairs. In this approach, experts are asked to compare different options, and then a quantitative ranking is created from the results obtained. It is commonly…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be…
We revisit the recent breakthrough result of Gkatzelis et al. on (single-winner) metric voting, which showed that the optimal distortion of 3 can be achieved by a mechanism called Plurality Matching. The rule picks an arbitrary candidate…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
In the peer selection problem a group of agents must select a subset of themselves as winners for, e.g., peer-reviewed grants or prizes. Here, we take a Condorcet view of this aggregation problem, i.e., that there is a ground-truth ordering…
We study the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games: the problem of finding a weighted voting game in which the power of the players is as close as possible to a certain target distribution. Our goal is to find algorithms…
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s).…