Related papers: Cautious Belief and Iterated Admissibility
In dialogical argumentation it is often assumed that the involved parties always correctly identify the intended statements posited by each other, realize all of the associated relations, conform to the three acceptability states (accepted,…
Conversational AI has a fundamental flaw as a knowledge interface: sycophantic chatbots induce epistemic entrenchment and delusional belief spirals even in rational agents. We propose the problem does not stem from the AI model, rooted…
When collaborating with an AI system, we need to assess when to trust its recommendations. If we mistakenly trust it in regions where it is likely to err, catastrophic failures may occur, hence the need for Bayesian approaches for…
Hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 1999) play a central role for the epistemic analysis of solution concepts in sequential games. They are modelled by type structures, which allow the analyst to represent the…
This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…
In experimental applications of bounded-reasoning models, behavior is often summarized by distributions of "levels". We argue that such summaries conflate two conceptually distinct dimensions: a player's type, capturing beliefs about what…
The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…
Understanding how biological organisms make decisions is of fundamental importance in understanding behavior. Such an understanding within evolutionary game theory so far has been sought by appealing to bounded rationality. Here, we present…
Admissibility has been studied for games of infinite duration with Boolean objectives. We extend here this study to games of infinite duration with quantitative objectives. First, we show that, un- der the assumption that optimal worst-case…
We consider finite games in strategic form with Choquet expected utility. Using the notion of (unambiguously) believed, we define Choquet rationalizability and characterize it by Choquet rationality and common beliefs in Choquet rationality…
The classical view of epistemic logic is that an agent knows all the logical consequences of their knowledge base. This assumption of logical omniscience is often unrealistic and makes reasoning computationally intractable. One approach to…
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…
This paper presents a theory of systemic undecidability, reframing incomputability as a structural property of systems rather than a localized feature of specific functions or problems. We define a notion of causal embedding and prove a…
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…
In the present paper, based on the previous work (Part I), we present a game semantics for the intensional variant of intuitionistic type theory that refutes the principle of uniqueness of identity proofs and validates the univalence axiom,…
We present a game semantics for intuitionistic type theory. Specifically, we propose categories with families of a new variant of games and strategies for both extensional and intensional variants of the type theory with dependent function,…
This article presents a formalism inspired by Dennett's notion of the intentional stance. Whereas Dennett's treatment of these concepts is informal, we aim to provide a more formal analogue. We introduce a framework based on stochastic…
The ideas of aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty are widely used to reason about the probabilistic predictions of machine-learning models. We identify incoherence in existing discussions of these ideas and suggest this stems from the…
This study provides a model of cyber deception with asymmetric recognition represented by private beliefs. Signaling games, which are often used in existing works, are built on the implicit premise that the receiver's belief is public…
Empirical evidence shows that human behaviour often deviates from game-theoretical rationality. For instance, humans may hold unrealistic expectations about future outcomes. As the evolutionary roots of such biases remain unclear, we…