Related papers: Fair Division with Interdependent Values
The problem of allocating indivisible resources to agents arises in a wide range of domains, including treatment distribution and social support programs. An important goal in algorithm design for this problem is fairness, where the focus…
The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online platforms. Little is known, however, about the characteristics…
We study the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items when agents have ternary additive valuations -- each agent values each item at some fixed integer values $a$, $b$, or $c$ that are common to all agents. The notions of fairness we…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
A supervised machine learning algorithm determines a model from a learning sample that will be used to predict new observations. To this end, it aggregates individual characteristics of the observations of the learning sample. But this…
We study the fair allocation problem of indivisible items with subsidy. In this paper, we focus on the notion of fairness - equitability (EQ), which requires that items be allocated such that all agents value the bundle they receive…
We study fair and economically efficient allocation of indivisible goods among agents whose valuations are rank functions of matroids. Such valuations constitute a well-studied class of submodular functions (i.e., they exhibit a diminishing…
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…
We study the problem of allocating divisible resources among $n$ agents, hopefully in a fair and efficient manner. With the presence of strategic agents, additional incentive guarantees are also necessary, and the problem of designing fair…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…
Incorporating fairness criteria in optimization problems comes at a certain cost, which is measured by the so-called price of fairness. Here we consider the allocation of indivisible goods. For envy-freeness as fairness criterion it is…
Fairness and privacy are two important concerns in social decision-making processes such as resource allocation. We study privacy in the fair allocation of indivisible resources using the well-established framework of differential privacy.…
The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…
Fair resource allocation is an important problem in many real-world scenarios, where resources such as goods and chores must be allocated among agents. In this survey, we delve into the intricacies of fair allocation, focusing specifically…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
Effective machine learning models can automatically learn useful information from a large quantity of data and provide decisions in a high accuracy. These models may, however, lead to unfair predictions in certain sense among the population…
In bandwidth allocation, competing agents wish to transmit data along paths of links in a network, and each agent's utility is equal to the minimum bandwidth she receives among all links in her desired path. Recent market mechanisms for…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely…