Related papers: Fair Division with Interdependent Values

We study the question of dividing a collection of indivisible goods amongst a set of agents. The main objective of research in the area is to achieve one of two goals: fairness or efficiency. On the fairness side, envy-freeness is the…

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods with variable groups. In this model, the goal is to partition the agents into groups of given sizes and allocate the goods to the groups in a fair manner. We show that for any number of…

The use of algorithmic decision making systems in domains which impact the financial, social, and political well-being of people has created a demand for these decision making systems to be "fair" under some accepted notion of equity. This…

In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' types. To do so, the designer constructs a mechanism which describes…

Allocating items in a fair and economically efficient manner is a central problem in fair division. We study this problem for agents with additive preferences, when items are all goods or all chores, divisible or indivisible. The celebrated…

We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of allocating a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classical cake cutting protocols are susceptible to manipulation. Do their strategic…

We initiate the study of computing envy-free allocations of indivisible items in the extension setting, i.e., when some part of the allocation is fixed and the task is to allocate the remaining items. Given the known NP-hardness of the…

Several different fairness notions have been introduced in the context of fair allocation of goods. In this manuscript, we compare between some fairness notions that are used in settings in which agents have arbitrary (perhaps unequal)…

In the one-dimensional facility assignment problem, m facilities and n agents are positioned along the real line. Each agent will be assigned to a single facility to receive service. Each facility incurs a building cost, which is shared…

Settings such as lending and policing can be modeled by a centralized agent allocating a resource (loans or police officers) amongst several groups, in order to maximize some objective (loans given that are repaid or criminals that are…

We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…

Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…

We study fair allocation of indivisible public goods subject to cardinality (budget) constraints. In this model, we have n agents and m available public goods, and we want to select $k \leq m$ goods in a fair and efficient manner. We first…

We study fair allocation of resources consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations. When only divisible or indivisible goods exist, it is known that an allocation that achieves the maximum Nash…

Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…

A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods between groups of agents using the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness. We consider the existence of fair allocations under different assumptions on the valuations of…

We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…