Related papers: Graphical One-Sided Markets with Exchange Costs
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
This paper considers ideal gas-like models of trading markets, where each agent is identified as a gas molecule that interacts with others trading in elastic or money-conservative collisions. Traditionally, these models introduce different…
This work considers the distributed computation of the one-to-one vertex correspondences between two undirected and connected graphs, which is called \textit{graph matching}, over multi-agent networks. Given two \textit{isomorphic} and…
We introduce and analyze a variation of the Bertrand game in which the revenue is shared between two players. This game models situations in which one economic agent can provide goods/services to consumers either directly or through an…
Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…
This paper studies a team coordination problem in a graph environment. Specifically, we incorporate "support" action which an agent can take to reduce the cost for its teammate to traverse some edges that have higher costs otherwise. Due to…
New services based on the best-effort paradigm could complement the current deterministic services of an electronic financial exchange. Four crucial aspects of such systems would benefit from a hybrid stance: proper use of processing…
We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
Our work introduces the effect of supply/demand imbalances into the literature on online matching with stochastic rewards in bipartite graphs. We provide a parameterized definition that characterizes instances as over- or undersupplied (or…
Financial markets are a classical example of complex systems as they comprise many interacting stocks. As such, we can obtain a surprisingly good description of their structure by making the rough simplification of binary daily returns.…
We study how trading costs are reflected in equilibrium returns. To this end, we develop a tractable continuous-time risk-sharing model, where heterogeneous mean-variance investors trade subject to a quadratic transaction cost. The…
In speculative markets, risk-free profit opportunities are eliminated by traders exploiting them. Markets are therefore often described as "informationally efficient", rapidly removing predictable price changes, and leaving only residual…
We propose a game-theoretic framework to study the outcomes of packetized payments, a cross-ledger transaction protocol, with strategic and possibly malicious agents. We derive the transaction failure rate and demonstrate that without…
This paper addresses the bipartite consensus-control problem in open multi-agent systems containing both cooperative and antagonistic interactions. In these systems, new agents can join and new interactions can be formed over time.…
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…
We prove the existence of an equilibrium in a model with transaction costs and price impact where two agents are incentivized to trade towards a target. The two types of frictions -- price impact and transaction costs -- lead the agents to…
We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
We introduce a two-agent problem which is inspired by price asymmetry arising from funding difference. When two parties have different funding rates, the two parties deduce different fair prices for derivative contracts even under the same…