Related papers: Graphical One-Sided Markets with Exchange Costs
A coordinated trading process is proposed as a design for an electricity market with significant uncertainty, perhaps from renewables. In this process, groups of agents propose to the system operator (SO) a contingent buy and sell trade…
This paper proposes matrix-scaled consensus algorithm, which generalizes the scaled consensus algorithm in \cite{Roy2015scaled}. In (scalar) scaled consensus algorithms, the agents' states do not converge to a common value, but to different…
We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
We study the problem of collaborative machine learning markets where multiple parties can achieve improved performance on their machine learning tasks by combining their training data. We discuss desired properties for these machine…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
This paper studies how a fixed flexibility budget should be allocated across the two sides of a balanced bipartite matching market. We model compatibilities via a sparse bipartite stochastic block model in which flexible agents are more…
We study a fair division problem in (multi)graphs where $n$ agents (vertices) are pairwise connected by items (edges), and each agent is only interested in its incident items. We consider how to allocate items to incident agents in an…
In this paper, we study a matching market model on a bipartite network where agents on each side arrive and depart stochastically by a Poisson process. For such a dynamic model, we design a mechanism that decides not only which agents to…
We study overpricing in a repeated game between two representative agents: a market maker, who controls market liquidity, and a market taker, who chooses trade quantities. Market prices evolve through the endogenous price impact of trades…
This paper deals with the alternative mathematical modeling of the two-side platform. Two-sided platforms are specific multi-sided platforms that bring together two distinct groups of a model. The stochastic modeling by adapting various…
We study how to maximize the broker's (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a single item to sell and holds a private value on her item, and…
Trades based on bilateral (indivisible) contracts can be represented by a network. Vertices correspond to agents while arcs represent the non-price elements of a bilateral contract. Given prices for each arc, agents choose the incident arcs…
I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a…
Large deployment of distribute energy resources and the increasing awareness of end-users towards their energy procurement are challenging current practices of electricity markets. A change of paradigm, from a top-down hierarchical approach…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
In many professons employees are rewarded according to their relative performance. Corresponding economy can be modeled by taking $N$ independent agents who gain from the market with a rate which depends on their current gain. We argue that…
In this chapter, an input-output economic model with multiple interactive economic systems is considered. The model captures the multi-dimensional nature of the economic sectors or industries in each economic system, the interdependencies…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…