Related papers: Distortion in metric matching with ordinal prefere…
We consider the following well-studied problem of metric distortion in social choice. Suppose we have an election with $n$ voters and $m$ candidates located in a shared metric space. We would like to design a voting rule that chooses a…
We study the design of voting rules in the metric distortion framework. It is known that any deterministic rule suffers distortion of at least $3$, and that randomized rules can achieve distortion strictly less than $3$, often at the cost…
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to…
We consider the distributed single-winner metric voting problem on a line, where agents and alternative are represented by points on the line of real numbers, the agents are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to choose a…
We study matching settings in which a set of agents have private utilities over a set of items. Each agent reports a partition of the items into approval sets of different threshold utility levels. Given this limited information on input,…
We consider committee election of $k \geq 2$ (out of $m \geq k+1$) candidates, where the voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter's cardinal preferences over candidates correspond to her distance…
We study deliberative social choice, where voters engage in small-group discussions to output collective preferences that are then aggregated by a social choice rule. We introduce a simple deliberation-via-matching protocol. In this…
In this paper, we study the distortion bounds for voting mechanisms in multi-winner elections in general metric spaces. Our study pertains to the case in which each voter only reports her favorite candidate amongst $m$ possible choices.…
Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, ordinal rankings are often the only available…
Many centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets that enjoy strong theoretical properties assume that the planner solicits full information on the preferences of each participating agent. In particular, they expect that…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…
We consider the problem of matching a metric space $(X,d_X)$ of size $k$ with a subspace of a metric space $(Y,d_Y)$ of size $n \geq k$, assuming that these two spaces have constant doubling dimension $\delta$. More precisely, given an…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
We study the performance of voting mechanisms from a utilitarian standpoint, under the recently introduced framework of metric-distortion, offering new insights along three main lines. First, if $d$ represents the doubling dimension of the…
We study the efficiency (in terms of social welfare) of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching problems with {\em dichotomous preferences} and {\em normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences}. We are particularly…
One way of evaluating social choice (voting) rules is through a utilitarian distortion framework. In this model, we assume that agents submit full rankings over the alternatives, and these rankings are generated from underlying, but…
Distortion-based analysis has established itself as a fruitful framework for comparing voting mechanisms. m voters and n candidates are jointly embedded in an (unknown) metric space, and the voters submit rankings of candidates by…
In the metric distortion problem, a set of voters and candidates lie in a common metric space, and a committee of $k$ candidates must be elected. The objective is to minimize a social cost, defined as a function of the distances between…
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the…
We study metric distortion in distributed voting, where $n$ voters are partitioned into $k$ groups, each selecting a local representative, and a final winner is chosen from these representatives (or from the entire set of candidates). This…