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Autonomous agents are promising in applications such as intelligent transportation and smart manufacturing, and scheduling of agents has to take their inertial constraints into consideration. Most current researches require the obedience of…
In cost sharing games with delays, a set of agents jointly allocates a finite subset of resources. Each resource has a fixed cost that has to be shared by the players, and each agent has a nonshareable player-specific delay for each…
An auction house cannot generally provide the optimal auction technology to every client. Instead it provides one or several auction technologies, and clients select the most appropriate one. For example, eBay provides ascending auctions…
We study an information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios where the private data is either observable or hidden. In each scenario, we first consider bounded mutual information as privacy leakage criterion, then we…
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constraint, prices for different allocations made by the mechanism…
This paper studies the problem of scheduling in single-hop wireless networks with real-time traffic, where every packet arrival has an associated deadline and a minimum fraction of packets must be transmitted before the end of the deadline.…
We consider the delay properties of max-weight opportunistic scheduling in a multi-user ON/OFF wireless system, such as a multi-user downlink or uplink. It is well known that max-weight scheduling stabilizes the network (and hence yields…
This paper reports an analysis of aspects of the project planning stage. The object of research is the decision-making processes that take place at this stage. This work considers the problem of building a hierarchy of tasks, their…
This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
We investigate a social system of agents faced with a binary choice. We assume there is a correct, or beneficial, outcome of this choice. Furthermore, we assume agents are influenced by others in making their decision, and that the agents…
This paper initiates a discussion of mechanism design when the participating agents exhibit preferences that deviate from expected utility theory (EUT). In particular, we consider mechanism design for systems where the agents are modeled as…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
Mechanism design for a social utility being the sum of agents' utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem. There are, however, a number of problems of theoretical and practical interest where a designer may have a different objective than…
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…
We consider the class of single machine scheduling problems with the objective to minimize the weighted number of late jobs, under the assumption that completion due-dates are not known precisely at the time when decision-maker must provide…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…