Related papers: Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests
We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet of numbers $p$, $t$ and $q$ denoting the…
Except for special classes of games, there is no systematic framework for analyzing the dynamical properties of multi-agent strategic interactions. Potential games are one such special but restrictive class of games that allow for tractable…
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…
We study a dynamic matching setting where homogeneous agents arrive at random according to a Poisson process and randomly form edges yielding a sparse market. Agents stay in the market according to a certain sojourn time and wait to be…
One attractive approach to market dynamics is the level $k$ model in which a level $0$ player adopts a very simple response to current conditions, a level $1$ player best-responds to a model in which others take level $0$ actions, and so…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
In Hotelling's model of spatial competition, a unit mass of voters is distributed in the interval $[0,1]$ (with their location corresponding to their political persuasion), and each of $m$ candidates selects as a strategy his distinct…
This paper analyzes the global dynamics of 1-dimensional agent arrays with nearest neighbor linear couplings. The equations of motion are second order linear ODEs with constant coeffcients. The novel part of this research is that the…
We study heterogeneous $k$-facility location games. In this model there are $k$ facilities where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is to design…
Understanding and predicting the behavior of large-scale multi-agents in games remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent systems. This paper examines the role of heterogeneity in equilibrium formation by analyzing how smooth…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
In this technical note, we investigate an optimal output consensus problem for heterogeneous uncertain nonlinear multi-agent systems. The considered agents are described by high-order nonlinear dynamics subject to both static and dynamic…
This paper fully studies distributed optimal consensus problem in non-directed dynamical networks. We consider a group of networked agents that are supposed to rendezvous at the optimal point of a collective convex objective function. Each…
This paper proposes an adaptation mechanism for heterogeneous multi-agent systems to align the agents' internal parameters, based on enforced consensus through strong couplings. Unlike homogeneous systems, where exact consensus is…
We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in the Hotelling-Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst voting rules, in which each voter is endowed with both a positive and a negative vote, i.e., each voter can…
We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…
The allocation of resources plays an important role in the completion of system objectives and tasks, especially in the presence of strategic adversaries. Optimal allocation strategies are becoming increasingly more complex, given that…
We leverage best response dynamics to solve monotone variational inequalities on compact and convex sets. Specialization of the method to variational inequalities in game theory recovers convergence results to Nash equilibria when agents…
We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p in [0, 1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p…
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