Related papers: Mechanism Design without Rational Expectations
Concept bottleneck models (CBMs) are interpretable neural networks that first predict labels for human-interpretable concepts relevant to the prediction task, and then predict the final label based on the concept label predictions. We…
We study model selection by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) in fixed-dimensional exploratory factor analysis over a fixed finite family of compact covariance classes. Our main result shows that the BIC is strongly consistent for…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
Randomized controlled experiments assess new policy impacts on performance metrics to inform launch decisions. Traditional approaches evaluate metrics independently despite correlations, and mixed results (e.g., positive revenue impact,…
The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas…
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the…
Many definitions of business processes refer to business goals, value creation, or profits/gains of sorts. Nevertheless, the focus of formal methods research on business processes, like the well-known soundness property, lies on correctness…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
The conventional approach to Bayesian decision-theoretic experiment design involves searching over possible experiments to select a design that maximizes the expected value of a specified utility function. The expectation is over the joint…
An obstruction-free implementation guarantees progress to every operation that is given enough time to take steps in isolation. But, as we show in this paper, the mere presence of concurrent operations alone does not have to prevent…
Context: Expert judgement is a common method for software effort estimations in practice today. Estimators are often shown extra obsolete requirements together with the real ones to be implemented. Only one previous study has been conducted…
When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…
Predictive models that are developed in a regulated industry or a regulated application, like determination of credit worthiness, must be interpretable and rational (e.g., meaningful improvements in basic credit behavior must result in…
A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to grasp…
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i.e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
We prove an impossibility result for conditional Probably Approximately Correct (PAC)-efficient reasoning in large language models. While recent work has established marginal PAC efficiency guarantees for composite models that switch…
We consider the impact of fairness requirements on the social efficiency of truthful mechanisms for trade, focusing on Bayesian bilateral-trade settings. Unlike the full information case in which all gains-from-trade can be realized and…
The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical…
We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…
We develop a hierarchical Bayesian dynamic game for competitive inventory and pricing under incomplete information. Two firms repeatedly choose order quantities and prices while facing two layers of uncertainty: unknown market demand and…