Related papers: Mechanism Design without Rational Expectations
We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…
Common sense suggests that when individuals explain why they believe something, we can arrive at more accurate conclusions than when they simply state what they believe. Yet, there is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit…
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private…
In statistical learning, models are classified as regular or singular depending on whether the mapping from parameters to probability distributions is injective. Most models with hierarchical structures or latent variables are singular, for…
We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
In the Bayesian persuasion model, a sender can convince a receiver to choose an alternative action to the one originally preferred by the receiver. A crucial assumption in this model is the sender's commitment to a predetermined information…
Simulation models, in particular agent-based models, are gaining popularity in economics. The considerable flexibility they offer, as well as their capacity to reproduce a variety of empirically observed behaviours of complex systems, give…
This paper analyzes how interaction effects can be consistently estimated under economically plausible assumptions in linear panel models with a fixed $T$-dimension. We advocate for a \emph{correlated interaction term estimator} (CITE) and…
Deep learning is renowned for its theory-practice gap, whereby principled theory typically fails to provide much beneficial guidance for implementation in practice. This has been highlighted recently by the benign overfitting phenomenon:…
Model selection is a ubiquitous problem that arises in the application of many statistical and machine learning methods. In the likelihood and related settings, it is typical to use the method of information criteria (IC) to choose the most…
As a schematic model of the complexity economic agents are confronted with, we introduce the ``SK-game'', a discrete time binary choice model inspired from mean-field spin-glasses. We show that even in a completely static environment,…
A rich class of mechanism design problems can be understood as incomplete-information games between a principal who commits to a policy and an agent who responds, with payoffs determined by an unknown state of the world. Traditionally,…
Popular statistical software provides Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for multilevel models or linear mixed models. However, it has been observed that the combination of statistical literature and software documentation has led to…
While the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) are powerful tools for model selection in linear regression, they are built on different prior assumptions and thereby apply to different data generation…
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for trading networks that satisfy four desired properties: dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, efficiency, weak budget balance (WBB), and individual rationality (IR). Although there exist…
The widely applicable Bayesian information criterion (WBIC) is a simple and fast approximation to the model evidence that has received little practical consideration. WBIC uses the fact that the log evidence can be written as an…
We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mechanism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each other. In the $ \alpha $-classification problem we are…
In bandit settings, optimizing long-term regret metrics requires exploration, which corresponds to sometimes taking myopically sub-optimal actions. When a long-lived principal merely recommends actions to be executed by a sequence of…