Related papers: Hail Mary Pass: Contests with Stochastic Progress

We provide a probabilistic approach to modeling the movements of subjects through multiple stages, with "stays" or survival at each stage for a random length of time, and ending at a desired final stage. We use conditional Markov chains…

This paper is devoted to studying the average optimality in continuous-time Markov decision processes with fairly general state and action spaces. The criterion to be maximized is expected average rewards. The transition rates of underlying…

For dynamic situations where the evolution of a player's state is influenced by his own action as well as other players' states and actions, we show that equilibria derived for nonatomic games (NGs) can be used by their large finite…

This paper studies a type of rank-based mean field game in which competing agents strategically switch among multiple effort regimes. We propose an entropy regularized auxiliary problem where the switching decisions are randomized to the…

We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…

Stochastic optimal control problems have a long tradition in applied probability, with the questions addressed being of high relevance in a multitude of fields. Even though theoretical solutions are well understood in many scenarios, their…

This paper studies a risk-sensitive decision-making problem under uncertainty. It considers a decision-making process that unfolds over a fixed number of stages, in which a decision-maker chooses among multiple alternatives, some of which…

We study the problem of resilient strategies in the presence of uncertainty. Resilient strategies enable an agent to make decisions that are robust against disturbances. In particular, we are interested in those disturbances that are able…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…

In the classical stochastic resetting problem, a particle, moving according to some stochastic dynamics, undergoes random interruptions that bring it to a selected domain, and then, the process recommences. Hitherto, the resetting mechanism…

The escape probability is a deterministic concept that quantifies some aspects of stochastic dynamics. This issue has been investigated previously for dynamical systems driven by Gaussian Brownian motions. The present work considers escape…

In this paper, we consider the gradual-impulse control problem of continuous-time Markov decision processes, where the system performance is measured by the expectation of the exponential utility of the total cost. We prove, under very…

This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of…

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…

Stochastic dominance serves as a general framework for modeling a broad spectrum of decision preferences under uncertainty, with risk aversion as one notable example, as it naturally captures the intrinsic structure of the underlying…

A stochastic process with movement, return, and rest phases is considered in this paper. For the movement phase, the particles move following the dynamics of Gaussian process or ballistic type of L\'evy walk, and the time of each movement…

This paper presents a game theoretic formulation of a graph traversal problem, with applications to robots moving through hazardous environments in the presence of an adversary, as in military and security scenarios. The blue team of robots…

A jumping process, defined in terms of jump size distribution and waiting time distribution, is presented. The jumping rate depends on the process value. The process, which is Markovian and stationary, relaxes to an equilibrium and is…

We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…