Related papers: GPT in Game Theory Experiments
As large language models (LLMs) like GPT become increasingly prevalent, it is essential that we assess their capabilities beyond language processing. This paper examines the economic rationality of GPT by instructing it to make budgetary…
Getting a group to adopt cooperative norms is an enduring challenge. But in real-world settings, individuals don't just passively accept static environments, they act both within and upon the social systems that structure their…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…
Human cooperation depends on how accurately we infer others' motives--how much they value fairness, generosity, or self-interest from the choices they make. We model that process in binary dictator games, which isolate moral trade-offs…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected…
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to…
While delegating tasks to large language models (LLMs) can save people time, there is growing evidence that offloading tasks to such models produces social costs. We use behavior in two canonical economic games to study whether people have…
Exploration of mechanisms underlying the emergence of collective cooperation remains a focal point in field of evolution of cooperation. Prevailing studies often neglect historical information, relying on the latest rewards as the primary…
Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence, especially with a focus on expert-level or even super-human play. But real life also pushes human intelligence along a…
In quantum game theory, one of the most intriguing and important questions is, "Is it possible to get quantum advantages without any modification of the classical game?" The answer to this question so far has largely been negative. So far,…
Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new…
In a mix of prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals engaged in strategic interactions, the individual intensity of prejudice is expected to have effect on overall level of societal prejudice. High level of prejudice should lead to…
Advanced persistent threats (APT) combine a variety of different attack forms ranging from social engineering to technical exploits. The diversity and usual stealthiness of APT turns them into a central problem of contemporary practical…
This article uses data from two experimental studies of two-person Prisoner's Dilemma games [1, 2] and compares the data with the theoretic predictions calculated with the use of a quantum game theoretical method. The experimental findings…
Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…
Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying graph G repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma against their neighbors. The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their opponents by applying the so-called…
We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the…