Related papers: The Computational Complexity of Equilibria with St…
In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…
Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
We study the problem of computing stationary Nash equilibria in discounted perfect information stochastic games from the viewpoint of computational complexity. For two-player games we prove the problem to be in PPAD, which together with a…
Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding…
We study constrained bi-matrix games, with a particular focus on low-rank games. Our main contribution is a framework that reduces low-rank games to smaller, equivalent constrained games, along with a necessary and sufficient condition for…
The distributed task allocation problem, as one of the most interesting distributed optimization challenges, has received considerable research attention recently. Previous works mainly focused on the task allocation problem in a population…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…