Related papers: Disclosure and Incentives in Teams
In many real-world strategic settings, people use information displays to make decisions. In these settings, an information provider chooses which information to provide to strategic agents and how to present it, and agents formulate a best…
In this paper, we consider sequential dynamic team decision problems with nonclassical information structures. First, we address the problem from the point of view of a ``manager" who seeks to derive the optimal strategy of the team in a…
Necessity of different competencies with high level of knowledge makes it inevitable that software development is a team work. With the today's technology, teams can communicate both synchronously and asynchronously using different online…
AI systems have been known to amplify biases in real-world data. Explanations may help human-AI teams address these biases for fairer decision-making. Typically, explanations focus on salient input features. If a model is biased against…
In a continuous-time setting we investigate how the management of a firm controls a dynamic choice between two generic voluntary disclosure decision rules: one with full and transparent disclosure termed $\it{candid}$, the other, termed…
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…
Collective robotic systems are biologically inspired and advantageous due to their apparent global intelligence and emergent behaviors. Many applications can benefit from the incorporation of collectives, including environmental monitoring,…
We study a model of dynamic two-stage R&D competition where the competing firms are uncertain about the difficulty of the first stage. Staying in the competition is costly and a firm can also choose whether and when to quit. When a firm…
We study a model of innovation with a large number of firms that create new technologies by combining several discrete ideas. These ideas are created via private investment and spread between firms. Firms face a choice between secrecy,…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
Individuals with similar qualifications and skills may vary in their demeanor, or outward manner: some tend toward self-promotion while others are modest to the point of omitting crucial information. Comparing the self-descriptions of…
Acknowledgments are one of many conventions by which researchers publicly bestow recognition towards individuals, organizations and institutions that contributed in some way to the work that led to publication. Combining data on both…
This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing,…
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of…
As we increasingly delegate important decisions to intelligent systems, it is essential that users understand how algorithmic decisions are made. Prior work has often taken a technocentric approach to transparency. In contrast, we explore…
We study a disclosure game with a large evidence space. There is an unknown binary state. A sender observes a sequence of binary signals about the state and discloses a left truncation of the sequence to a receiver in order to convince him…
In this paper, we derive team and person-by-person optimality conditions for distributed differential decision systems with different or decentralized information structures. The necessary conditions of optimality are given in terms of…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…
Peer prediction mechanisms are often adopted to elicit truthful contributions from crowd workers when no ground-truth verification is available. Recently, mechanisms of this type have been developed to incentivize effort exertion, in…
This paper introduces a model of a stylized organization that is comprised of several departments that autonomously allocate tasks. To do so, the departments either take short-sighted decisions that immediately maximize their utility or…