Related papers: Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation Constra…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among $n$ agents with the objective of maximizing Nash social welfare (NSW). This welfare function is defined as the geometric mean of the agents' valuations and, hence, it strikes a…
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…
We analyze the sketching approximability of constraint satisfaction problems on Boolean domains, where the constraints are balanced linear threshold functions applied to literals. In~particular, we explore the approximability of…
We investigate a model of sequential decision-making where a single alternative is chosen at each round. We focus on two objectives -- utilitarian welfare (Util) and egalitarian welfare (Egal) -- and consider the computational complexity of…
Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a variant of additively separable hedonic games where agents…
We introduce and analyze an extension to the matching problem on a weighted bipartite graph: Assignment with Type Constraints. The two parts of the graph are partitioned into subsets called types and blocks; we seek a matching with the…
A principal delegates a project to a team $S$ from a pool of $n$ agents. The project's value if all agents in $S$ exert costly effort is $f(S)$. To incentivize the agents to participate, the principal assigns each agent $i\in S$ a share…
An energy community is modeled as a cooperative game, where a veto player is needed beyond the prosumers to manage the community, and the worth of a coalition is its benefit compared to the selfish behaviour of the prosumers. Properties of…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
In the committee selection problem, we are given $m$ candidates, and $n$ voters. Candidates can have different weights. A committee is a subset of candidates, and its weight is the sum of weights of its candidates. Each voter expresses an…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government. Our focus is on picking…
In this paper we focus on noncooperative games with uncertain constraints coupling the agents' decisions. We consider a setting where bounded deviations of agents' decisions from the equilibrium are possible, and uncertain constraints are…
We study the fair and truthful allocation of m divisible public items among n agents, each with distinct preferences for the items. To aggregate agents' preferences fairly, we focus on finding a core solution. For divisible items, a core…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
For any $\varepsilon>0$, we give a simple, deterministic $(4+\varepsilon)$-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem under submodular valuations. We also consider the asymmetric variant of the problem, where the…
We consider the joint scheduling-and-power-allocation problem of a downlink cellular system. The system consists of two groups of users: real-time (RT) and non-real-time (NRT) users. Given some average power constraint on the base station,…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…
Recently Cole and Gkatzelis gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm for the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents, under additive valuations, so as to maximize the Nash Social Welfare. We give constant factor…
We study the problem of finding approximate Nash equilibria that satisfy certain conditions, such as providing good social welfare. In particular, we study the problem $\epsilon$-NE $\delta$-SW: find an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash…