Related papers: Robust Stackelberg Equilibria
We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is…
This paper investigates the energy-efficient power allocation for a two-tier, underlaid femtocell network. The behaviors of the Macrocell Base Station (MBS) and the Femtocell Users (FUs) are modeled hierarchically as a Stackelberg game. The…
Fictitious play (FP) is a canonical game-theoretic learning algorithm which has been deployed extensively in decentralized control scenarios. However standard treatments of FP, and of many other game-theoretic models, assume rather…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), self-interested agents attempt to establish equilibrium and achieve coordination depending on game structure. However, existing MARL approaches are mostly bound by the simultaneous actions of…
The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not rely on any specific properties…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
The sim-to-real gap, where agents trained in a simulator face significant performance degradation during testing, is a fundamental challenge in reinforcement learning. Extansive works adopt the framework of distributionally robust RL, to…
We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…
Long-horizon goal-conditioned tasks pose fundamental challenges for reinforcement learning (RL), particularly when goals are distant and rewards are sparse. While hierarchical and graph-based methods offer partial solutions, their reliance…
Despite their numerous successes, there are many scenarios where adversarial risk metrics do not provide an appropriate measure of robustness. For example, test-time perturbations may occur in a probabilistic manner rather than being…
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…
We tackle a fundamental problem in empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), that of learning equilibria of simulation-based games. Such games cannot be described in analytical form; instead, a black-box simulator can be queried to obtain…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are…
In the context of adversarial robustness, a single model does not usually have enough power to defend against all possible adversarial attacks, and as a result, has sub-optimal robustness. Consequently, an emerging line of work has focused…
Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new…
Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form…
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem,…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg game of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) with partial information, where the information of the follower is a sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that of the leader. Necessary and sufficient…
We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…